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ABSTRACT
Over the past three years, major reforms have been approved in Spain in order to restructure the banking sec-
tor. The purpose of these reforms has been to reinforce the solvency of credit institutions through recapitalization and
integration into larger organizations. The credit cooperatives have not presented any solvency problems which would
justify these measures being applied to them. The problem that the financial authorities see in their case is their
limited size. As a result, the credit cooperatives are immersed in an integration process which is not revolving around
the Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol (BCE) or the Spanish Association of Rural Savings Banks, as might be expected,
but is taking place through mergers between individual institutions and the setting up of various cooperative groups.
While the credit cooperatives have not been channelled into bankization (conversion into banks) like the savings
banks, ways to become banks have been opened up to them.
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ACCEPTANCE DATE: 10/10/2011La viabilidad de las cooperativas de crédito
españolas tras la reciente regulación sobre
capitalización y reestructuración bancaria
RESUMEN: En los ￺ltimos tres a￱os se han aprobado en Espa￱a importantes reformas que han implicado
la reestructuraci￳n del sector bancario. Esas reformas han tenido por objeto reforzar la solvencia de las entida-
des de cr￩dito, a trav￩s del incremento de sus recursos propios y su integraci￳n en estructuras de mayor dimen-
si￳n. En el caso de las cooperativas de cr￩dito, no han tenido problemas de solvencia que justificasen la aplicaci￳n
de esas medidas. El problema que para las autoridades financieras presentan las cooperativas de cr￩dito es su
reducido tama￱o. Las cooperativas de cr￩dito est￡n inmersas por esa causa en un proceso de integraci￳n que
no se est￡ realizando en torno al Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol (BCE) o a la Asociaci￳n Espa￱ola de Cajas Rurales,
como cabr￭a esperar, sino a trav￩s de la fusi￳n entre entidades individuales y mediante la constituci￳n de diver-
sos grupos cooperativos. Las cooperativas de cr￩dito no se han visto abocadas a un proceso de “bancarizaci￳n”
o transformaci￳n en bancos, como las cajas de ahorro, pero s￭ se han abierto v￭as para ello.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Cooperativas de cr￩dito, legislaci￳n, crisis financiera, reestructuraci￳n, Espa￱a.
Dans quelle mesure les coopératives de crédit
en Espagne sont-elles viables après la récente
réglementation sur la capitalisation et la
restructuration bancaire ?
RESUME : Au cours des trois derni￨res ann￩es, des r￩formes majeures ont ￩t￩ adopt￩es en Espagne afin
de restructurer le secteur bancaire. L’objectif de ces r￩formes ￩tait de renforcer la solvabilit￩ des ￩tablissements
de cr￩dit par le biais de la restructuration de leur capital et de leur int￩gration dans de plus grandes organisations.
Les coop￩ratives de cr￩dit n’ont pr￩sent￩ aucun probl￨me de solvabilit￩ qui justifierait que ces mesures leur soient
appliqu￩es. Le seul probl￨me que les autorit￩s financi￨res distinguent dans leur cas, c’est leur taille limit￩e. Par
cons￩quent, les coop￩ratives de cr￩dit sont plong￩es dans un processus d’int￩gration qui ne gravite pas autour
du Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol (BCE) ou de l’Association espagnole des caisses d’￩pargne rurales, comme l’on
pourrait s’y attendre, mais qui se d￩roule par le biais de fusions entre des institutions individuelles et la cr￩ation
de diff￩rents groupes coop￩ratifs. Bien que les coop￩ratives de cr￩dit n’aient pas ￩t￩ prises dans la ﾫ bancari-
sation ﾻ (la transformation en banques) comme les caisses d’￩pargne, des voies vers la transformation leur ont
￩t￩ ouvertes.
MOTS CLÉ : Coop￩rative de cr￩dit, l￩gislation, crise financi￨re, processus de restructuration, Espagne.
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This presentation attempts to explain the situation in which Spanish credit cooperatives find them-
selves following the recent reform of the financial sector. After referring to the main features that dis-
tinguish credit cooperatives in Spain and reviewing the main laws relating to the banking sector that
have been passed since 2009, we will look at the effect this reform has had on credit cooperatives.
Lastly, we will end with some personal opinions on this process and how it may affect the future of
the cooperative credit sector in Spain.
2.1. Recognition in the Constitution
The Spanish Constitution in force since 1978 establishes in article 129.2 that the public authorities
shall foster cooperative societies through suitable legislation. The scope of this mandate embraces
all cooperatives, including credit cooperatives3. It is the duty of the authorities (Parliament and national,
regional and local government) to foster credit cooperatives and to do so through legislation that is
appropriate for this purpose.
2.2. Credit cooperatives as credit institutions
Royal Legislative Decree 1298/1986 on 28 of June states that together with banks and saving
banks, credit cooperatives are credit institutions.
1.- Introduction1
2.- Credit cooperatives in Spain. Main
characteristics2
1.- This paper is part of a research project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Research, The Social Economy in Public Policy.
An economic policy perspective (DER2009-14462-C02-02). It was presented at the ICA Global Research Conference New Opportunities for Co-
operatives. Mikkeli, 2011. It has been translated into English by Mary Georgina Hardinge.
2.- General studies on credit cooperatives in Spain may be found in SANCHIS J.R. (1997) El cr￩dito cooperativo en Espa￱a: un enfoque
estrat￩gico sobre las cooperativas de cr￩dito, CIRIEC-Espa￱a; PALOMO, R.J. (2000) Pasado, presente y futuro de la banca cooperativa en
Espa￱a, CIRIEC-Espa￱a; or PALOMO, R.J. and VALOR, C. (2001) Banca cooperativa: entorno financiero y proyecci￳n social, Uni￳n Nacional de
Cooperativas de Cr￩dito.
3.- FONT DE MORA, P. and CONDE, C. (2003) “Las cooperativas de cr￩dito y la Constituci￳n Espa￱ola" in CIRIEC- Espa￱a. Revista de
econom￭a p￺blica, social y cooperativa, no. 47, p. 105- 117.Being credit institutions, credit cooperatives are subject to the banking regulations, mainly Law
26/1988 on the Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions, Law 13/1985 on Investment Ratios,
Own Funds and Reporting Requirements of Financial Intermediaries and Royal Decree 2606/1996 on
Deposit Guarantee Funds.
Credit cooperatives are the smallest and most numerous of Spain’s financial institutions.
2011 Banks Savings Banks Credit Coops.
No. of institutions 71 35 80
Assets ᾬ 1,718,940 M ᾬ 1,252,424 M ᾬ 125,259 M
SOURCE: Bank of Spain. Register of Institutions (April 2011) and Statistical Bulletin (2011), http://www.bde.es.
2.3. Special legislation: substantive and fiscal, national and regional
Credit cooperatives are not only financial institutions but also cooperatives, however, and as such,
they are subject to the laws on cooperatives.
In Spain, the nation (the State) and the regions (Autonomous Communities) share the power to
legislate on cooperatives, but the basic rules on banking and credit matters are the responsibility of the
State.
Credit cooperatives are governed by national Law 13/1989 on Credit Cooperatives and their pur-
suant Regulations (Royal Decree 84/1993). Secondarily, they are also governed by the applicable
Cooperatives Act (national Law 27/1999 of 16 July 1999 or the regional cooperative law). Some regions
have also developed the legislation on credit cooperatives further (Law 5/2001 in Extremadura and
Decree 83/2005 in the Valencia region).
Lastly, Law 20/1990 of 19 December 1990 on the Tax System for Cooperatives also applies to
credit cooperatives, particularly articles 39 and 404.
2.4. Peculiarities of their legal status
Credit cooperatives can also be called rural savings banks (cajas rurales) when they provide their
financial services in country areas. Setting up a credit cooperative requires authorization from the
Economy and Treasury Ministry, following a report from the Bank of Spain, and registration in the
Cooperatives Register, the Company Register and the Bank of Spain’s Register of Institutions.
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4.- For more information on credit cooperatives in the Spanish legal system see VICENT (1994) “El nuevo estatuto jur￭dico de las cooperati-
vas de cr￩dito" in Revista de Derecho Bancario y Burs￡til, no. 53, p. 9-52 and no. 54, p. 305-337; and VALENZUELA and VALENZUELA (2007) “Las
cooperativas de cr￩dito en el vigente ordenamiento jur￭dico espa￱ol (una visi￳n sint￩tica)" in Estudios de derecho de sociedades y derecho concur-
sal: libro homenaje al profesor Rafael Garc￭a Villaverde Vol. 3, p. 1609-1632.Credit cooperatives can engage in the same transactions as other financial institutions. They have
to give priority to attending to their members’ needs and their transactions with non-members must
remain below 50% of their total funds. The Government sets the required level of capital for founding
and running a credit cooperative according to the area in which it will operate and the population of that
area.
Credit cooperative members can be individual or legal persons. Every member must hold at least
one certificate of contribution to the cooperative’s capital with a value of no less than ᾬ 60. The total
contributions of each member may not exceed 20% of the capital in the case of a legal person or 2.5%
for an individual. Under no circumstances may legal persons that are not cooperatives hold more than
50% of the cooperative’s share capital.
The shareholders’ return on paid-up capital may not be greater than 6 points above the legal rate
of interest and after covering the losses of previous years and subtracting taxes and compensation on
capital, a minimum of 20% of the profit has to be allocated to the indivisible Obligatory Reserve Fund
and between 10% and 30% to the cooperative’s Education and Promotion Fund. The remainder can
be allocated to dividends or voluntary reserves.
Each member has one vote at the General Meetings, although the articles of association can decide
that the vote will be weighted in proportion to the capital or work contributed, or to the membership of
the cooperative members. The majority of the board of directors must be members and their liability
is equivalent to that of the directors of a sociedad an￳nima (approximately equivalent to a public lim-
ited company) if the post is remunerated.
From the tax point of view, credit cooperatives are fiscally protected: their profits attract 26% com-
pany tax compared to 35% for banks.
2.5. The organization of cooperative credit in Spain
The Spanish Association of Credit Cooperatives was founded in 1989 and changed its name to
Spanish Association of Rural Savings Banks (Asociaci￳n Espa￱ola de Cajas Rurales) in 1995.
Practically all the rural savings banks belong to it. This association is the core of the Grupo Caja Rural,
which also includes a bank (Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol S.A. BCE) and other organizations set up
in the 1980s to provide services to the group, such as Rural Servicios Inform￡ticos (IT services) o Rural
Grupo Asegurador (insurance).
All the credit cooperatives also belong to the National Union of Credit Cooperatives (Uni￳n Nacional
de Cooperativas de Cr￩dito), which represents them and defends their interests.
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erations and that of the social economy (CEPES).
Among the 80 credit cooperatives in existence in 2011, 76 are rural savings banks and the rest are
credit cooperatives set up by professional groups (engineers, lawyers, architects) or as part of a coop-
erative group (Grupo Mondrag￳n’s Caja Laboral Popular).
2.6. Credit cooperatives as social economy institutions
The Spanish Parliament recently passed Law 5/2011 of 29 March 2011 on the Social Economy.
Its purpose is to establish a shared legal framework for all the organizations that make up the social
economy, with full regard for the specific rules that apply to each of them, and to determine mea-
sures to foster them, in recognition of their characteristic aims and principles (article 1).
This law defines the social economy as the body of activities carried out by organizations that pur-
sue the collective interest of their members and/or the general interest, whether economic or social
or both, and operate according to certain guiding principles. In article 5 it identifies cooperatives as
social economy organizations and its preamble justifies this insofar as the different types of coopera-
tive, including credit cooperatives, share the guiding principles of the social economy.
In accordance with the ultimate purpose of this law, article 8 considers the promotion, encour-
agement and growth of social economy organizations and their federations to be in the general inter-
est. This should be materialized in actions such as removing the obstacles that prevent social economy
organizations from starting and expanding an economic activity, or promoting the principles and val-
ues of the social economy.
3.1. Changes to the system for conversion of credit cooperatives
Law 3/2009, passed on 3 April 2009, regulates structural changes in commercial companies (con-
version, merger, split or general assignment of assets and liabilities. It does not affect cooperatives
directly, as in law they are not considered commercial companies, but some of the provisions are applic-
able to them. One of these is the Fourth Final Provision, which modifies the Credit Cooperatives Law
by establishing, among other matters, that when a credit cooperative is converted into a different type
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3.- Recent changes in the law with an impact
on credit cooperativesThis rule has subsequently been confirmed by Law 2/2011 of 4 March 2011 on the Sustainable
Economy, which specifies that the balance of the Obligatory Reserve Fund of a converted credit coop-
erative may become part of the share capital of the resulting company in the 2011 financial year (Ninth
Transitory Disposition).
3.2.Banking sector reorganization and recapitalization of credit institutions involved
in integration processes
Royal Decree Law 9/2009 on bank restructuring and credit institution equity reinforcement was
passed on 26 June 2009. This instrument aims, on the one hand, to increase the solvency and
strengthen the management of credit institutions that find themselves in difficulties by means of an
orderly reorganization of the banking system and, on the other hand, to support integration processes
among credit institutions that are not in difficulties but wish to improve their medium-term efficiency.
According to this law, such integration processes can include, among others, what are known as
Institutional Protection Systems, which have aims that can be considered similar to those which are
generated in a merger as regards the way they operate, the adoption and execution of policies and
strategies by the organizations in question and the institution and exercise of their internal and risk
management controls.
To carry out both processes (restructuring and recapitalization), this law set up the Fund for Orderly
Bank Restructuring (Fondo de Reestructuraci￳n Ordenada Bancaria FROB). This fund has an initial
endowment of ᾬ 9,000 million and can seek external funding of up to 10 times this initial sum on the
equity markets. It will provide assistance by buying convertible preference shares with a five-year con-
version date5.
3.3. Recapitalization of the credit institutions
Royal Decree Law 2/2011 for the reinforcement of the financial system was passed on 18 February
2011. This law takes measures that aim to reinforce the capital of the credit institutions. Its preamble
justifies these measures on the grounds that doubts have been expressed about the soundness of
Spain’s financial system and in order to dispel any uncertainty, it must be ensured that all the institu-
tions in the Spanish banking system possess top-quality capitalization levels.
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5.- This assistance is subject to the limitations and conditions set out by the European Commission in several Communications since 13
October 2008. It was approved by the Commission and its closing date was subsequently extended. On the compatibility between this assis-
tance and Competition Law see URIA, F (2010) “Crisis financiera, mecanismos de apoyo a las entidades de cr￩dito en dificultades y Derecho de
la competencia" in Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de Espa￱a, no. 18, p. 85-108.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esThe measures set out in this Royal Decree Law are:
a) Reinforcement of capital through early application of the new international capital requirements
(Basle III).
b) Adaptation of the FROB as a public policy instrument to facilitate the required capitalization
levels.
The law on reinforcement of the financial system (RDL 2/2011) requires financial institutions that
may take deposits of repayable funds from the public to possess a core capital of at least 8% of their
total risk-weighted assets, rising to 10% when these institutions meet the following two conditions:
a) They have a wholesale funding ratio of over 20%
b) They have not placed certificates of equity ownership or voting rights representing a percent-
age of 20% or more of their capital with their members or shareholders (article 1).
Core capital is defined as including, among others, contributions to the capital of the credit coop-
eratives and their joining fees and reserves, whether statutory or required by their articles of associa-
tion (article 2).
The new core capital level was required by 10 March 2011 and if an institution was unable to meet
the requirement, it was required to submit a strategy to the Bank of Spain within 15 days with a cal-
endar for completion by 30 September 2011. The strategy could include attracting funds from third par-
ties, stock market listing or resorting to funding from the FROB (First Transitory Provision).
The 10% core capital requirement is aimed at the savings banks that have a wholesale funding
ratio in excess of 20% because their legal form is a foundation, they have no members and although
it is possible for them to issue participation shares, such issues have been neither frequent nor suffi-
cient. The reason the preamble to this law gives for this discriminatory treatment is that these institu-
tions find it less easy to raise capital if they need to do so.
The higher capital requirement that has to be achieved within 6 months is giving rise to mergers
between savings banks and their conversion into banks in order to be able to offer shares to third par-
ties, including the FROB. Whichever option is taken, whether seeking private capital investors (insti-
tutional or otherwise), stock market listing or acquiring a public shareholder, the savings banks have
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4.- Credit cooperatives and the bank
recapitalization processto be converted into public limited companies (become banks) or set up banks and transfer their busi-
ness to them.
The only savings banks that will be allowed to retain their present form are ones of limited size that
have not had recourse to a high percentage of wholesale funding. The savings banks of Ontinyent
(Valencia) and Pollen￧a (Mallorca) are in this situation.
Turning now to the credit cooperatives, since they are cooperatives all their capital is shared
between their members and they have barely used any wholesale funding to meet their needs.
Consequently, the core capital ratio required of them is 8%.
On 10 February 2011 the Bank of Spain revealed the solvency ratios of Spanish banks, noting that
all the credit cooperatives were above the required 8% level. Also, even if they needed to increase their
capital they could seek funding from their members and third parties, including the FROB, without need-
ing to become banks.
The purposes of the above-mentioned Royal Decree Law 9/2009 include strengthening the sol-
vency and management of credit institutions that find themselves in difficulties through an orderly reor-
ganization of these institutions.
The preamble to this law recognizes that the viability of some medium or small credit institutions
could be jeopardized as a result of the current recession, which is characterized by a hardening of con-
ditions for obtaining funding on the market, deterioration of property-based asset values, an increase
in bad debts and a shrinking business.
Under normal circumstances this situation would be remedied by the measures provided in law
(Royal Decree 2606/1996 on the legal regime of Credit Institution Deposit Guarantee Funds). However,
the present situation is not considered normal, as it affects numerous institutions and could poten-
tially generate a systemic risk, so additional instruments and public resources need to be provided in
case they need to be used.
This was the reason for setting up the FROB, with the mission of managing credit institution reor-
ganization processes and helping to reinforce their equity.
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5.- Credit cooperatives and reorganization of
the banking sector to rescue institutions in
difficultiesThe restructuring process comprises three successive stages (articles 6 and 7):
1) Private solutions must be sought to reinforce the solvency of the institution at risk.
2) If it has not proved possible to solve the situation privately, an action plan for one of the fol-
lowing must be submitted to the Bank of Spain: reinforcement of the institution’s assets and
solvency; its merger or takeover; or total or partial transfer of its business or of business units.
These measures will have the support of the sector’s Deposit Guarantee Fund.
3) If the weakness persists despite the above measures, the FROB will intervene.
In this last stage, the institution’s management will be replaced by administrators appointed by the
FROB, who will draw up a Plan to restructure the institution through merging it with another or other
institutions of recognized solvency or by transferring part or all of its business to other institutions through
general or partial assignment of its assets and liabilities. This Plan must set out the form that the FROB’s
support will take in terms of both financial support measures and management measures.
The financial support measures can consist in providing guarantees, loans under favourable terms
or subsidiary funding, or acquiring any type of asset shown on the institution’s financial statements or
subscribing or acquiring securities representing its equity ownership.
The investments made by the FROB in executing a restructuring plan will not be subject to certain
legal limitations or obligations, such as restrictions on attending general meetings, voting rights, etc.
Should a credit cooperative undergo a banking reorganization process, the FROB could contribute
to its funds by subscribing or acquiring contributions to its capital (article 7.3 a). In this case, the legal
limitations on the acquisition of contributions to credit cooperative share capital by legal persons shall
not apply and the right to vote in the assembly shall be in proportion to the share capital represented
by the contributions acquired or subscribed (articles 7.6 c and 7.9).
The credit cooperatives have also suffered the consequences of the recession6 but unlike the sav-
ings banks, they have had higher levels of equity, have not had recourse to international funding, have
been conservative about opening new branches outside their native areas and have taken a smaller
part in funding the property sector, the cause of the crisis in Spain. As a result, to date they have not
created any solvency problems that would make it advisable to subject them to the reorganization
process we are examining7.
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6.- According to data supplied by the Bank of Spain, credit cooperative profits fell from ᾬ 774 million in 2007 to ᾬ 256 million in 2010.
7.- Some recent writings on the financial crisis and the credit cooperatives may be cited here: CALVO and PAUL (2010) “Las cajas de ahor-
ros y las cooperativas de cr￩dito ante la crisis: evoluci￳n en su presencia territorial y en su operativa" in REVESCO. Revista de estudios coop-
erativos, no. 100, p. 68-100; SEGUￍ and SERVER (2010) “Las cooperativas de cr￩dito y su entorno en el contexto de la crisis bancaria: an￡lisis
de su capital relacional como base desde la que explotar oportunidades" in CIRIEC-Espa￱a. Revista de econom￭a p￺blica, social y cooperativa,
no. 68, no. 35-59; or ENCINAS and ESCRIBANO (2011) “Evoluci￳n comparada del modelo de negocio de las cooperativas de cr￩dito en el
contexto de la crisis financiera" in Bolet￭n econ￳mico de ICE, Informaci￳n Comercial Espa￱ola, no. 3006, p. 43-61.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.es6.1. Integration to resize credit institutions
One of the most salient features of the Spanish banking system has been the small size of its insti-
tutions. The financial authorities consider this a weakness and have tried to combat it by encouraging
mergers and takeovers.
The first bank mergers took place in the 1980s. Currently only two Spanish banks, Santander and
BBVA, are of a size that can be considered internationally competitive8.
Integration between savings banks and between credit cooperatives mainly occurred in the 1990s.
The credit institutions were integrated with different legal forms. Law 12/1989 on Credit Cooperatives
and its pursuant regulations (Royal Decree 84/1993) made it possible for credit cooperatives to inte-
grate with banks and savings banks, mainly through global assignment of assets and liabilities9.
Despite these integration processes, at the end of 2008 there were 66 banks, 46 savings banks
and 83 credit cooperatives registered in Spain10.
Royal Decree Law 9/2009 was passed in 2009, as we have already mentioned. As well as regu-
lating the reorganization of banking institutions in difficulty, it also provided for measures to support
integration between credit institutions that are not encountering difficulties but wish to improve their effi-
ciency in the medium term.
The preamble to this law considers that in the present climate, integration is necessary in order
to obtain equity on the wholesale markets. The experts emphasize that when wholesale capital mar-
kets are called upon to provide funds, the cost of these liabilities varies according to each institution’s
credit rating, and the rating agencies’ calculations are based not only on solvency but also on size. The
international markets are said to distrust small financial intermediaries more than large ones. Solvency
alone does not suffice to achieve a good rating, it needs to be accompanied by volume, and it is the
credit institutions with the best ratings that find it easiest to obtain international loans11.
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8.- According to a financial report the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) published in March 2011, as of December 2010 the Santander
group had consolidated assets worth over ᾬ 1217 billion (US thousand billion) and those of the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) group
exceeded ᾬ 552 billion. See http://www.aebanca.es/internet/groups/public/documents/publicaciones/18-201101144.pdf.
9.- On these processes, see VA￑ￓ, M.J. (2001) Fusi￳n heterog￩nea y cesi￳n global en el sector bancario, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
10.- All the data on the number of registered credit institutions cited in this paper have been published on the Bank of Spain website. See
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/secciones/servicio/regis/regent.html.
11.- The Bank of Spain report of December 2010 on the situation and prospects of the Spanish banking sector (Situaci￳n y perspectiva del
Sector Bancario Espa￱ol) analyzes the legislation to support integration among the credit institutions and emphasizes that their aim is to achieve
larger institutions which, among other things, will enjoy lower funding costs, as greater size makes it easier to obtain funding on the markets.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/secciones/prensa/situacion/actualizacionsectorbancarioesp122010.pdf (see p. 21).
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6.- Credit cooperatives and integration. The
institutional protection system (SIP)Integration, which will receive support from FROB funds, can take the form of a merger or can be
carried out through an Institutional Protection System (SIP), which has similar aims to those generated
in a merger.
The measures to support the integration of credit institutions are aimed at all the types: banks, sav-
ings banks and credit cooperatives. According to the Governor of the Bank of Spain, it makes no sense
to have credit institutions with assets of under ᾬ 70,000 million12.
From December 2009 to December 2010, integration processes between savings banks reduced
their number from 46 to 35. These processes took the form of mergers and takeovers. Savings banks
are also integrating through Institutional Protection Systems (SIP), whereby they preserve their legal
personality but set up banks and transfer their business to them13. These processes will continue if the
Banks of Spain’s objective, as is being said, is no more than 17 savings banks in no more than 6 groups
with assets of around ᾬ 80,000 million each.
Some smaller banks will probably also use the SIP system to merge with each other and with other
credit institutions in the coming months.
Credit cooperatives are the smallest and most numerous of the credit institutions. Over the past
10 years their number has fallen from 94 to 80, but the Bank of Spain still considers that there are
too many and they are too small. In total, the 80 credit cooperatives have assets worth ᾬ 125,259
million, of which over ᾬ 30,000 million belong to the Cajamar group and ᾬ 21,210 million to the Caja
Laboral Popular, the two largest.
The credit cooperatives are also involved in integration processes, mainly mergers and SIPs.
6.2. Credit cooperative integration
Credit cooperatives are also being called upon to integrate. Indeed, given their limited size, they
are the institutions that most need to do so, according not only to the authorities but also to the sec-
tor itself14.
They can employ various methods: merger, general assignment of assets and liabilities, cooper-
ative groups or institutional protection systems15.
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12.- Remarks published on 28 February 2011 in the Spanish business newsletter Intelligence & Capital News Report, no. 692.
13.- Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (Bankia), Banco Base, Banca C￭vica or Banco Mare Nostrum.
14.- According to the secretary general of the National Union of Credit Cooperatives (UNACC), "The credit cooperatives do not have a sol-
vency or bad debt problem but a size problem, and they are already laying the foundations for a more solid future, which will allow them to gain
competitive strength" (http://www.finanzas.com/noticias/bolsas/2011-02-18).
15.- On credit cooperative concentration see BELMONTE and CORT￉S (2010) “La concentraci￳n del sector de cooperativas de cr￩dito
en Espa￱a" in CIRIEC-Espa￱a. Revista de econom￭a p￺blica, social y cooperativa, no. 68, p. 223-246; and on cooperative integration instruments,
VICENT CHULI￁, F. (2010) “Sistemas institucionales de protecci￳n (SIP) y reestructuraci￳n bancaria, como derecho paraconcursal" in Revista
Derecho Concursal y paraconsursal, no. 13, p. 47.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esa) Merger
Traditionally, cooperatives have been allowed to merge, but only with other cooperatives16. Law
13/1989 of 26 May 1989 on credit cooperatives appeared to allow mixed mergers, but without expressly
saying so17. This possibility was confirmed when the regulations pursuant to this law (Royal Decree
84/1993 of 22 January 1993) were approved, as article 30 regulated the authorization requirement
for mergers involving credit cooperatives and allowed various types of merger. As well as mergers
between credit cooperatives and with cooperatives in general, it provides for mergers with other deposit-
takers when a merger proposal has not been taken up by other cooperative sector companies within a
stated period of time. Later, the Cooperatives Act currently in force (Law 27/1999 of 16 July) expressly
allowed cooperatives to merge with partnerships or commercial companies of all kinds, provided that
no legal rule prohibits it18. According to this law, the legislation that applies to these processes is that
of the company that absorbs the other or others or that is founded as a result of the merger, but as
regards the adoption of the agreement and the guarantees for the members and creditors of the coop-
eratives taking part, the provisions of cooperative law apply. Lastly, if the company formed by the merger
is not a cooperative, the obligatory legal reserves, which are indivisible, do not become assets of that
company (article 67).
b) General assignment
Mergers are allowed between institutions with members or shareholders (banks and credit coop-
eratives), but not between credit cooperatives and savings banks, as the latter are foundations. As a
result, the mechanism used in these cases is a general assignment of assets and liabilities. The credit
cooperatives regulations envisaged this possibility, but it has not been regulated in the cooperative
laws19. For commercial companies, general assignment of assets and liabilities is regulated by Law
3/2009 of 3 April 2009 on structural modifications (articles 81 to 91). While law 3/2009 does not apply
directly to cooperatives, in the event of legal omission such as this it can be applied by analogy.
c) Second-tier cooperatives and cooperative groups
Another way that cooperatives can integrate is to set up second-tier cooperatives and cooperative
groups.
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16.- Article 94 of Spain's Cooperative Law 3/1987 of 2 April 1987, provided for cooperatives' merging to form a new cooperative, or one or
more being taken over by an existing cooperative.
17.- Article 10 states that "in the event of the institution resulting from the merger … being a credit cooperative …", implying that the result
of the merger could be a different type of organization.
18.- For more detail on cooperative mergers, particularly in credit cooperatives, see FAJARDO (2006) “La fusi￳n de cooperativas en la leg-
islaci￳n espa￱ola" in CIRIEC-Espa￱a. Revista jur￭dica de econom￭a social y cooperativa, no. 17, p. 35-84.
19.- An exception was the Valencia region's Cooperative Law 3/1995 of 2 March 1995, which regulated the general assignment of assets
and liabilities. It required the agreement to be taken with the same majorities required for changes in the articles of association and to set out the
conditions of assignment, taking into account an independent expert's valuation of the assets and liabilities assigned. This agreement had to be
made public and had to recognize the right of the assigner's and assignee's creditors to oppose it, under the same conditions and with the same
effects as in the case of mergers (article 67).
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esSecond-tier cooperatives have to be set up by at least two cooperatives, but they can also have
members that are other types of legal person, public or private, up to a maximum of 45% of their total
membership. Their purpose can be to promote, coordinate and carry out the shared economic aims of
their members, but they can also reinforce and even integrate the economic activities of the latter.
No member of a second-tier cooperative may hold more than 30% of its share capital (Cooperatives
Law 27/1999, article 77).
Cooperative groups were first mentioned in Spanish law when the arrangements for taxing the con-
solidated profits of groups of companies were adapted to cover groups of cooperatives (Royal Decree
1345/1992 of 6 November 1992).
Shortly afterwards, cooperative groups were regulated by Cooperatives Law 27/1999 (article 78),
which defined them as groups formed of several cooperatives, whatever their class and whatever the
organization heading the group that exercises powers or issues instructions that the cooperatives in
the groups are obliged to carry out, such that unity of decision occurs within the scope of these pow-
ers. The issuing of instructions can involve the spheres of management, administration or governance
of the cooperatives and the agreements in this regard can consist, among others, in establishing com-
mon rules through the articles of association or through internal regulations, in relationships of asso-
ciation between the primary tier cooperative members or in undertakings to supply resources.
d) Institutional Protection Systems
An Institutional Protection System or Institutional System of Protection (Sistema Institucional de
Protecci￳n – SIP) is a contractual mutual assistance mechanism. It was introduced into the Spanish
financial system by Royal Decree 216/2008 of 15 February 2008 on the shareholders’ equity of credit
institutions and the Bank of Spain’s Circular 3/2008 of 22 May 2008 on determining and controlling the
minimum equity of credit institutions. These effect the incorporation into Spanish law of article 80.8 of
European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/48/CE of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, which, in turn, gives concrete form to the Basle
Agreement on Banking Supervision (Basle II).
The initial objective of the SIP is not integration but protection in crisis situations. As Mart￭n de
Vidales20 says, it does not emerge from a reading of the SIP rules that this system is any kind of inte-
gration mechanism, but rather one to reinforce solvency and liquidity whereby some institutions take
responsibility for others and common rules on risks and risk control are demanded of them. The SIP
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20.- MARTￍN DE VIDALES (2010) “El SIP como f￳rmula de integraci￳n de entidades financieras" in Revista de derecho del mercado de val-
ores, no. 6, p. 242.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esHowever, while the SIP is not necessarily an integration mechanism it can become one, essentially
because its scant regulation makes it possible to reach agreements for greater involvement between
the participants. This gradation makes it possible to differentiate between:
• Soft or regulation SIPs that only aim to strengthen their solvency and liquidity through a mutual
guarantee mechanism and centralization of their risk management, without mutualising prof-
its.
• Strong or reinforced SIPs where as well as the above undertakings, at least 40% of the equity
and profits of each of the institutions taking part are mutualised and an institution is set up to
head the group.
• Highly reinforced SIPs, with mutualisation of 100% of the participants’ profits.
A SIP can constitute a consolidatable group, bearing in mind that control over another company
can be achieved not only by holding the majority voting rights or the right to appoint the majority of
the directors in the controlled companies, but also through integration and shared control agreements
such as those setting up a SIP. In fact, as M￭nguez points out21, the formulae the credit institutions are
being offered do not answer to the idea of a SIP but to the better-known concept of the contractual
group.
For instance, Law 13/1985 of 25 May 1985 on investment ratios, own funds and reporting require-
ments of financial intermediaries states that a group of credit institutions can be considered a consol-
idatable group if it forms a SIP through a contractual agreement and meets certain requirements:a
central institution that takes binding decisions on the group’s business policies and strategies as well
as its internal and risk management control levels and measures; the contractual agreement setting up
the SIP contains a mutual solvency and liquidity undertaking between the participant institutions that
covers at least 40% of the equity of each; a significant proportion (at least 40%) of their results are
pooled and distributed in proportion to the share of each; the agreement establishes a minimum 10
year continuance in the SIP; etc. (article 8).
However, the law that most clearly sees the SIP as an integration formula is probably Royal Decree
Law 9/2009, which we referred to earlier. This set up the FROB, with aims that include supporting
processes to integrate credit institutions. As its preamble states, these processes can comprise (among
others) SIPs that have similar objectives to those generated during a merger as regards their operat-
ing methods, the definition and execution of the participant institutions‘ policies and strategies and
the introduction and implementation of their internal and risk management controls.
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21.- MￍNGUEZ (2010) “Estructuras de integraci￳n contractuales entre entidades de cr￩dito: los denominados Sistemas Institucionales de
Protecci￳n. Situaci￳n tras los Reales Decretos-Leyes 6/2010, de 9 de abril y 11/2010, de 9 de julio" in Revista de derecho del mercado de val-
ores, no. 7, p. 9.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esThe similarity mentioned by this Royal Decree Law has led to these processes being described as
‘cold fusion’ (fusi￳n is also the Spanish for ‘merger’). However, unlike a merger, a SIP does not dis-
solve and extinguish the legal persons that comprise it, nor do these lose their legal personality. Also,
mergers unite the entirety of the assets of all the companies involved, whereas the institutions partic-
ipating in a SIP are under no obligation to hold their assets in common; even in an integration SIP they
only share the assets they have agreed to, not their entire equity.
This institutional integration system can be applied by any group of credit institutions and there-
fore also by credit cooperatives22.
In 2005 the Bank of Spain tried to persuade all the credit cooperatives to consolidate their balance
sheets with the Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol, but the proposal did not succeed23.
Later, in 2008, following the approval of its Solvency Circular (3/2008), the Bank of Spain urged
the credit cooperatives to set up an Institutional Protection System (SIP).
Up to that point, the cooperatives in the Caja Rural group had not only the statutory Deposit
Guarantee Fund but also an internal solidarity fund to tackle situations of insolvency among its mem-
bers. However, this mechanism could only be activated if there was sufficient consensus within the
association. A SIP makes it possible to act more swiftly, as it does not need a decision by the meeting
of the Spanish Association of Rural Savings Banks to start operating. Also, the SIP controls non-com-
pliance by its members and conducts its own risk assessments.
On 8 May 2009, four rural savings banks set up the first SIP in Spain, the Grupo Cooperativo
Cajamar. It is a soft SIP, with no mutualisation of profits. Since then a number of mergers have taken
place, new SIPs have been set up and existing ones have grown as new credit cooperatives have
joined them.
Since the first of these, the Bank of Spain is now only authorizing SIPs that mutualise all their prof-
its and give each other unlimited support.
To date, the SIPs set up by credit cooperatives have either made an existing credit cooperative
their central institution or have formed a second-tier cooperative, but it would also be possible for them
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22.- On the application of these systems to credit cooperatives see PALOMO and SANCHIS (2010) “Los Sistemas Institucionales de
Protecci￳n (SIP) en las entidades financieras de econom￭a social: su aplicaci￳n en las cooperativas de cr￩dito” in Creando clientes en merca-
dos globales: Building client relationships in global markets (coord. Redondo L￳pez).
23.- Among the reasons mentioned for this failure are that consolidation of the accounts was more demanding as it required solidarity and
involved setting up a central body to control the solvency of the institutions, with the power to issue binding instructions, and that neither Cajamar
nor DZBank (both large BCE shareholders) took part in the initiative to consolidate the accounts.
www.ciriec-revistaeconomia.esThe rules discussed earlier have led most of the savings banks to set up banks and obliged them
to transfer their entire business to these, which in the medium term could bring about the disappear-
ance of savings banks as a legal form of company. This process, which has been justified by the need
to recapitalize, has been termed the bankization of the savings banks.
As the credit cooperatives have no solvency, liquidity or bad debt problems, do not use the inter-
national wholesale markets for funding and have share capital that can be acquired by members and
others, for the time being they have not found themselves compelled to become banks or to set up
banks and transfer their business to them.
Owing to their size, however, they do find themselves obliged to undertake integration, and while
these processes do not require them to become banks it is certainly possible for them to merge with
banks or to set up a bank to head the Institutional Protection System group and transfer their business
to it.
These risks of bankization have been joined by a new rule, approved on the grounds that the equity
of the credit institutions needs to be reinforced, which constitutes an incentive to convert credit coop-
eratives into banks. Law 3/2009 on structural modifications in commercial companies has modified
credit cooperative law by introducing the rule that when a credit cooperative is converted into a differ-
ent type of credit institution (a bank), its Obligatory Reserve Fund becomes part of the share capital
of the resulting institution.
The main question this raises is who owns the shares that correspond to the fund which has become
part of the share capital. In the Spanish Parliament it was argued that these shares should be distrib-
uted among the cooperative members turned shareholders. We argue that the ownership of these
shares belongs to those who would be the assignees of these funds in the event of conversion of the
cooperative in accordance with cooperative law and the articles of association of the cooperative24.
Subsequently, Law 2/2011 on the Sustainable Economy has extended the possibility of assign-
ing the Obligatory Reserve Fund to share capital to cases in which a credit cooperative has already
been converted into a bank, irrespective of how this fund had been assigned. This is a retroactive
rule and its interpretation and application may create serious problems.
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24.- FAJARDO (2010) “Aspectos de la transformaci￳n de las cooperativas de cr￩dito tras la ley de modificaciones estructurales de 2009"
in Estudios de Derecho del Mercado Financiero. Homenaje al Profesor Vicente Cu￱at, Universitat de Valencia, p. 91. As the European Commission
says, asset-stripping and 'de-mutualisations' must be avoided and on conversion of a cooperative, its assets should be distributed according to
the principle of disinterested distribution (Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Promotion of Co-operative Societies, 2004).
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7.- ‘Bankization‘ or converting credit
cooperatives into banksThere have been credit cooperatives in Spain since the end of the 19th century. They have been
regulated by special laws that are common to all of them (despite the plurality of Spain’s cooperative
legislation). These laws have respected the cooperative principles (although they have allowed voting
rights in proportion to capital) and have allowed credit cooperatives a tax regime of their own in accor-
dance with their characteristics.
As credit institutions, credit cooperatives are subject to the control and supervision of the Bank of
Spain and like banks and savings banks, they can conduct all kinds of banking activities.
According to Spanish law, credit cooperatives should be encouraged, because they are coopera-
tives (Spanish Constitution, article 129.2) and because they belong to the Social Economy sector (Law
5/2011).
Over the past three years, major reforms have been approved in Spain in order to restructure the
banking sector.
The purpose of these reforms has been to reinforce the solvency of credit institutions through recap-
italization and integration into larger organizations.
The credit cooperatives have not presented any solvency problems which would justify these mea-
sures being applied to them. The problem that the financial authorities see in their case is their lim-
ited size.
As a result, the credit cooperatives are immersed in an integration process which is not revolving
around the Banco Cooperativo Espa￱ol (BCE) or the Spanish Association of Rural Savings Banks, as
might be expected, but is taking place through mergers between individual institutions and the set-
ting up of various cooperative groups.
While the credit cooperatives have not been channelled into bankization (conversion into banks)
like the savings banks, ways to become banks have been opened up to them.
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